identified symptoms of this reality during his tenure, he did not examine the deep structural aspects of this problem. This article demonstrates that such an examination would have revealed the crucial need for binding international human rights obligations for business entities in any adequate strategy aimed at addressing corporate impunity. It concludes with some recommendations for developing such obligations incrementally.
Keywords: corporate accountability, corporate impunity, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, Protect, Respect and Remedy, Ruggie, SRSG, TWAIL, UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and other Business Entities [T] here is no long-term future outside of a radical cultural shift banning the self-serving Western perspective. … the beginning is necessary of a process aimed at the development of a legal system that is much less about creating an efficient backbone for an exploitative economy and much more about a vision of civilization, justice and respect …
1
[T]hose studying globalization must begin to consider the ways in which globalizing processes intersect with and reproduce pre-existing forms of exploitation and exclusion. 2 
INTRODUCTION
There is something very wrong with our global economic system which takes little, if any, account of the environmental and human rights costs of business activity. Such costs are neither internalised by markets nor adequately able to restrain market actors as 'external' norms or standards. As Paul Hawken notes, 'the single most damaging aspect of the present economic system is that the expense of destroying the earth is largely absent from the prices set in the marketplace'. 3 Meanwhile, Upendra Baxi has remarked that '[t]he suffering of impoverished people is irrelevant to the ruling standards of the global capital, which must measure excellence of economic entrepreneurship by standards other than those provided by endless human rights normativity'. 4 Moreover, there is a considerable unevenness of treatment between human rights and environmental concerns. While it may be possible to discern at least a rhetorical willingness among powerful corporate actors to consider binding legal obligations to address some of the environmental impacts of commerce that contribute to climate change, any discussion of binding international human rights obligations still meets with strong resistance, if not vehement opposition. 5 This resistance has characterised the debate on business and human rights for decades.
The current iteration of this debate now occupies a central place in global politics and has been focused around the (now completed) mandate of Harvard Professor John Ruggie, the United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises (SRSG) . 6 This new UN special procedure emerged out of the ashes of the controversy created by the draft UN Norms on the Responsibility of Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights (the Norms), 7 which were unanimously adopted in 2003 by the former Sub-Commission on Promotion and Protection of Human Rights. Their submission to the Human Rights Commission (now the Human Rights Council) sparked a heated controversy and propelled the issue to the forefront of global debate. Unlike other codes of conduct and multistakeholder initiatives such as the Global Compact, 8 the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 9 or the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights,report 20 and further developed in his 2009 21 and 2010 22 reports. The policy framework and Guiding Principles focus on addressing the regulatory gaps in relation to the human rights impacts of business activity, and, in particular, business activity in so-called 'Third World' 23 states. One cannot dispute the significance of Ruggie's contribution to the global dialogue on corporate accountability. In addition to his articulation of the policy framework and Guiding Principles aimed at the framework's operationalisation, the work of the SRSG has been invaluable for the volume of studies commissioned on key issues related to corporate human rights accountability, for the comprehensive mapping of current international standards and so-called 'governance gaps', 24 and importantly, for the bridges Ruggie has built to bring states and business back to the table. 25 However, although it was within the scope of his mandates to do so, 26 neither the policy framework nor the Guiding Principles elaborate a role for binding international human rights obligations for business actors. Beyond making a recommendation to ' (1998) 16 Wisconsin Int'l L J 353, 360). Makau Mutua explains that 'Third World' 'describes a set of geographic, oppositional, and political realities that distinguish it from the West. It is a historical phenomenon that has a dialectic relationship with Europe in particular and the West in general. The Third World is more truly a stream of similar historical experiences across virtually all nonEuropean societies that have given rise to a particular voice, a form of intellectual and political consciousness. The term Third World is different from less-developed, crisis-prone, industrialising, developing, underdeveloped, or the South because it correctly captures the oppositional dialectic between the European and non-European, and identifies the plunder of the latter by the former. It places the state of crisis of the world on the global order that the West has created and dominates' (M Mutua, 'What is TWAIL? ' (2000) 94 ASIL Proc 31, 35). See also BS Chimni, who states that 'because legal imagination and technology tend to transcend differences in order to impose uniform global legal regimes, the use of the category "third world" is particularly appropriate in the world of international law. It is a necessary and effective response to the abstractions that do violence to difference. Its presence is, to put it differently, crucial to organizing and offering collective resistance to hegemonic policies' (BS Chimni International law's invisible hand 9 the HRC for the establishment of an international process to clarify legal standards relating to egregious violations of human rights that amount to international crimeswhich are already widely accepted to be applicable to business entities -Ruggie did not recommend that, going forward, the UN strategy for addressing corporate human rights impunity should include the goal of developing international legal obligations for business entities.
Both the 2008 policy framework and the Guiding Principles were well received by the HRC 27 and by the business community. 28 The fact that these documents failed to include a call for the development of new international legal obligations for corporations likely contributed to their favourable reception. 29 Indeed, from the adoption of the UN 27. Jerbi points out that 'with 28 countries joining the 12 cross-regional co-sponsors of the resolution and passage without a vote, the Human Rights Council's endorsement of the Guiding Principles could not be stronger' (see S Jerbi, 'UN Adopts Guiding Principles Norms by the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, to the end of the SRSG's six-year tenure, the business community has consistently opposed the development of such binding standards. 30 On the other hand, the work of the SRSG has been criticised by others (mainly less powerful stakeholders such as NGOs and some Third World states) who would have liked to have seen the SRSG go further and include some reference to the role of such binding human rights obligations within his overall strategy for addressing corporate human rights impunity.
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This article will argue that Ruggie's approach to addressing this crucial issue was misconceived and that the product of his two mandates may now allow the HRC and the global business community (six years on) to embrace principles that remain problematic -due to their inadequate standards and the lack of oversight mechanisms 32 -without having to take any real steps towards effectively dealing with corporate accountability. According to Ruggie, '[t]he root cause of the business and human rights predicament today lies in the governance gaps created by globalization -between the scope and impact of economic forces and actors, and the capacity of societies to manage their adverse consequences'. These gaps, he has argued, create a 'permissive environment for the wrongful acts by companies of all kinds without adequate sanctioning or reparation'. 33 It will be argued here, however, that to address corporate impunity effectively, one cannot simply deal with the governance gaps alone. One must also identify and address the root causes of those gaps.
This article contends that corporate human rights impunity is deeply embedded in the international legal system. It begins (in section 2) by assessing the SRSG's approach to binding international legal obligations for business entities. Section 3 analyses the 'Protect, Respect and Remedy' policy framework and the Guiding Principles in light of Ruggie's focus on strengthening host state governance capacity. Sections 4 and 5 will then seek to demonstrate the problems with the SRSG's approach by arguing that, along with the interventions of international financial institutions in the economies of developing states, one of the most significant impediments to 30 corporate human rights accountability is the structure of the international legal system itself. The validity of this assertion will be explored through an examination of the critiques of the international legal system by Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) scholars, as well as insights drawn from feminist critiques of international law. It will be contended that powerful states have used international law and international institutions to create a globalised legal environment which protects and facilitates corporate activity. Section 6 will argue that although the SRSG identified symptoms of this reality during his tenure, 34 he did not examine the deep structural aspects of this problem. As will become clear below, such an examination by the SRSG would have revealed the crucial need for binding international human rights obligations for business entities in any adequate strategy aimed at addressing corporate impunity. The article will conclude with some recommendations for developing such obligations incrementally.
BINDING OBLIGATIONS FOR CORPORATE ACTORS AND THE APPROACH OF THE SRSG
Throughout his mandate, the SRSG implied that binding international obligations for corporate actors might be included in his strategy to address corporate human rights impunity. In his 2006 report to the Human Rights Committee, Ruggie suggested that there might be limited circumstances where it would be helpful to impose international legal obligations on business actors, particularly in situations where the host state is unable or unwilling to regulate the human rights impacts of these entities.
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Making reference to the Norms and to his decision that they were unhelpful to the advancement of the mandate, 36 Ruggie maintained that he had not ruled out the possibility that international obligations could have a place in his recommendations:
nothing that has been said here should be taken to imply that innovative solutions to the challenges of business and human rights are not necessary or that the further evolution of international and domestic legal principles in relation to corporations will not form part of those solutions. 37 He also noted that: '[i]nternational instruments may well have a significant role to play in this process, but as carefully crafted precision tools complementing and augmenting existing institutional capacities'. 38 His policy framework, he has stated, 'offers a platform for generating cumulative and sustainable progress without foreclosing further development of international law ' . 39 Yet, despite his contention that he had not written binding international obligations out of his plan, neither the final report of the SRSG's first mandate, 40 Principles, 42 outline any concrete role for international legal obligations for corporations. 43 Admittedly, Ruggie did propose that the HRC establish a process for clarifying 'the applicability to business enterprises of international standards prohibiting gross violations of human rights abuses, potentially amounting to the level of international crimes'. 44 One of the three options which he put forward was 'an intergovernmental process of drafting a new international legal instrument to address the specific challenges posed by this protection gap'. 45 However, in his presentation of the Guiding Principles and the recommendations for follow-up on his mandate, Ruggie warned that while:
…the law must continue to evolve and keep pace with -indeed to guide -socio-economic changes and normative aspirations … any attempt to squeeze all elements of business and human rights into an all-encompassing international legal instrument would quickly take us back to the contentious pre-2005 days, and thus be counterproductive. 46 Outside the formal UN reports, the SRSG actually pushed back against calls for binding international human rights obligations for corporate actors. He argued that short-term action was needed and that 'there are bodies of law and regulation applicable to business that have greater leverage over business practices, and in a shorter span of time, than traditional international human rights law, and that the human rights community needs to take advantage of those opportunities'. 47 He focused on measures he saw as both effective and feasible. 48 His justification for not calling for binding obligations was premised on the idea that there was an expectation among civil society organisations and other stakeholders of immediate action on such a treaty. For Ruggie, the slowness of international treaty negotiations, the risk that such a process would undermine shorter-term measures to elevate corporate human rights standards, as well as the problem of how such obligations would be enforced, were important reasons not to recommend the negotiation and adoption of a treaty that would impose international legal obligations 42 Ruggie has even urged the international community to move beyond the focus on international corporate human rights obligations. 51 Such responsibilities, on their own, he observes, 'cannot fix larger imbalances in the system of global governance', which he notes -quoting Iris Marion Young -'are the product of the mediated actions of many ' . 52 Yet while such obligations are clearly not a panacea, this statement does not adequately explain why a recommendation to develop such obligations (in the future) did not find a place in his framework or in the recommendations for the follow-up to his mandate. In his critique of the UN Norms he went so far as to suggest that binding international human rights obligations could themselves undermine the governance capacity of states by weakening 'domestic political incentives to make governments more responsive and responsible to their own citizenry', 53 an argument that has also been made by the business community.
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3 THE 'PROTECT, RESPECT AND REMEDY' POLICY FRAMEWORK, THE GUIDING PRINCIPLES AND GOVERNANCE CAPACITY For Ruggie, an important first step in addressing corporate human rights impunity was the further elucidation and codification of the state 'duty to protect'. This exercise, he argued, would help to clarify where direct legal obligations for corporations might be needed. 55 Accordingly, the 'Protect, Respect and Remedy' framework aims to provide a coherent approach to addressing governance gaps and at overcoming the problems of individual action by states and corporate actors, 56 as well as to provide a means by which to develop the normative content of corporate responsibility for human rights. The framework focuses on three pillars: the further development of the state duty to protect under international human rights law; the clarification of the moral responsibility of corporate actors to respect human rights; and the development of remedies for victims of corporate violations of human rights. 57 framework and its further development or 'operationalization' in the 2009 and 2010 reports, along with the 'Guiding Principles', goes some way to addressing aspects of the problem of corporate human rights impunity. This includes: disentangling and clarifying the respective human rights obligations of states under international human rights law and the moral responsibility of corporations to respect human rights (to do no harm); suggesting a range of important policy areas on which both home and host states should focus in order to ensure that corporate actors respect human rights in their business activities; providing ideas for grievance mechanisms for victims of human rights abuses, and providing guidance to states and business on how to implement these policies.
In the 2010 report, Ruggie developed five core policy areas 'through which states should strive to achieve greater policy coherence and effectiveness as part of their duty to protect'. 58 These are: (a) the safeguarding of state capacity to protect international human rights; 59 (b) human rights considerations for states engaging in business with corporate actors; (c) policies for ensuring a human rights sensitive corporate culture; (d) guidance for business activity in conflict zones; and (e) the problem of extraterritorial jurisdiction.
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Sections (b) to (d) deal with domestic measures to be taken by states, and section (e) deals with the question of the authority and capacity of states to regulate extraterritorial conduct. It is in section (a) that the SRSG specifically addresses problems for human rights governance capacity associated with international law and the international legal system. The SRSG focuses on bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and host state government agreements (HGAs). With respect to BITs (and free trade 58. SRSG, '2010 Report' (n 18) 19. 59. Under international human rights, states have a three-part obligation to respect, protect and fulfil human rights. The obligation to protect is an obligation of due diligence, which obliges states to take measures to prevent, regulate, investigate and prosecute actions by private actors, including business entities which violate the rights of individuals subject to that state's jurisdiction. See . In his 2008 report, Ruggie notes that he is not advocating 'specific legislative or policy actions', but rather pointing to key problems (that 'deserve serious consideration') and innovative means addressing them (SRSG, 'Protect, Respect and Remedy' (n 20) [28] ). In response to an NGO critique of the 2008 policy framework, the SRSG stated that his discussion of strategies to address the problem of transnational human rights governance was 'illustrative material, intended to throw greater light on what the three foundational principles of the framework mean and imply' and that specific recommendations would follow the HRC's approval of the framework (Ruggie, 'Response by John Ruggie to Misereor/Global Policy Forum' (n 48)). In SRSG, '2010 Report' (n 18) [17] , Ruggie notes that the section sets out a variety of 'possible' measures for states 'to promote corporate respect for human rights and prevent corporate-related abuse'. However, it is clear from the wording in para 19 ('The Special Representative has identified five priority areas though which States should strive to achieve greater policy coherence and effectiveness as part of their duty to protect' emphasis added) that Ruggie is clearly advocating particular approaches to addressing governance capacity. At the very least, one could state that certain categories of solutions are being emphasised above others. The wording above supports this view.
agreements (FTAs) with investment chapters) the SRSG endorses the view -widely held among NGOs, international human rights scholars, as well as some international investment law scholars -that these agreements, which create strong protections for foreign investors (corporations) in host states, can also impose regulatory constraints on these states. 61 In addition, under these agreements, investors usually have rights to bring host states to binding arbitration for violations of the provision of the treaty.
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As the SRSG observes, through arbitration or the threat of arbitration 'a foreign investor may be able to insulate its business venture from new laws and regulations, or seek compensation from the Government for the cost of compliance'. 63 This, Ruggie notes, creates an imbalance between investor rights and the state 'duty to protect' human rights. 'Consequently, host States can find it difficult to strengthen domestic social and environmental standards, including those related to human rights, without fear of foreign investor challenge.' 64 To address this problem, the SRSG urges states that are in the process of, or considering, reviewing their policy with respect to these agreements 'to ensure that the new model BITs combine robust investor protection with adequate allowances for bona fide public interest measures, including human rights, applied in a non-discriminatory manner'. 65 Similarly, a study carried out for the SRSG with the support of the IFC identified the potential for HGAs to constrain host state governance capacity in the area of human rights. 66 These agreements often include stabilisation clauses which impose constraints on host state regulatory change, either by freezing the law of the host state for the duration of the project, or by requiring the host state to compensate investors for the cost of compliance with any new laws that may adversely affect the 'economic equilibrium' of a project. 67 As with BITs, the investor corporations often have the right to take host states to binding international arbitration to seek compensation, even if the impugned regulations are introduced for the purpose of protecting human rights. 68 One of the interesting findings of the SRSG-IFC report, highlighted by Ruggie, is that where contracts between investors and OECD host states contained stabilisation clauses, these provisions were 'tailored … to preserve public interest considerations'. 69 Conversely, HGAs signed with non-OECD states had stabilisation clauses which were significantly more constraining of the regulatory powers of the host state than those signed with OECD states, and these clauses were applicable to a broader set of laws. 70 Moreover, the most constraining of these types of provisions were found in contracts with Sub-Saharan African states. 71 The SRSG notes that the 'imbalance' created by these agreements 'is particularly problematic for developing countries. … [and] it is precisely in developing countries that regulatory development may be most needed'. 72 He otherwise makes no comment on the wider significance of these findings. In his 2010 report, he simply concludes that 'one important step for States in fulfilling their duty to protect against corporate-related human rights abuses is to avoid unduly and unwittingly constraining their human rights policy freedom when they pursue other policy perspectives '. 73 Likewise, Guiding Principle 9 suggests that states 'maintain adequate domestic policy space to meet their human rights obligations when pursuing business-related policy objectives with other States or business enterprises, for instance through investment treaties or contracts'. 74 Leaving aside how this might be accomplished, or whether in the case of some states it is even feasible, protecting policy space for host states will not fully address the power differential or leverage that investors can have vis à vis a Third World host state by virtue of these agreements. Even the most powerful states have been subject to arbitral proceedings or threats of such proceedings with respect to the introduction . Shemberg concludes that based on the data 'the economic equilibrium clauses found in the non-OECD contracts on the whole apply to a broader set of laws (and therefore a broader set of social and environmental laws) than do the large majority of the contracts from OECD countries. This means that the contracts in this study from non-OECD countries are more likely than those from OECD countries to result in exemptions for the investor from new social and environmental laws or to provide compensation to the investor for its compliance with such laws' (ibid [132] of public interest legislation that would allegedly have an impact on investors' protected investment. 75 Traditional BITs and other international investment treaties provide the host state with few if any tools to ensure that the investment will support sustainable development. 76 Host states have no means under these treaties to address investor conduct that has a negative impact on human rights. These agreements include no obligations for investors to comply with human rights standards and there are no mechanisms to regulate investor behaviour, nor are there any means for host states to counterclaim in any arbitral proceedings brought against them where the investor has committed, or been complicit in, grave violations of human rights.
One means of addressing the power imbalance between host states and investors would be to include in these BITs and HGAs legally binding human rights obligations for investors, along with other targeted provisions, that might address a host state's sustainable development goals. 77 Indeed, a submission to the SRSG from the International Institute for Sustainable Development has called for the development of 'model language that can be included in [international investment agreements] in order to promote the articulation and implementation of human rights values in international investment '. 78 Moreover, at least two model treaties have been drafted which include such language. 79 The negotiation of a BIT creates an opportunity to include not only provisions that address policy space but provisions that proactively enhance host state governance capacity. VanDuzer, Simons and Mayeda have noted that:
Incorporating such obligations for investors into [a BIT] helps to address some of the difficulties faced by host states in regulating investor conduct since it allows for the use of treatybased enforcement mechanisms, which can complement those available in domestic law. 80 Regrettably the SRSG did not recommend such obligations, and missed an opportunity to use the goodwill he had developed during his mandates to address this imbalance. His policy framework and Guiding Principles include only moral or voluntary responsibilities for corporations, except to the extent that certain behaviour is required by domestic law. 81 Secondly, the SRSG's recommendations with respect to BITs and HGAs appear to ignore or to gloss over the power relations reflected in, and created by, these types of agreements, as well as the long history of exploitation of Third World states and facilitation of foreign corporate activity. For instance, in the 2008 report, he suggested that in drafting and negotiating BITs, '[s]tates, companies, the institutions supporting investments, and those designing arbitration procedures should work towards developing better means to balance investor interests and the needs of host States to discharge their human rights obligations'. 82 This assumes that companies will change their modus operandi and support measures that may diminish their leverage with host states and increase the regulatory hold over their activities -something that companies have worked hard to avoid since the end of the colonial period. 83 In addition, in the 2008 report, the SRSG puts forward peer-learning as one means of providing guidance and support for host state regulatory control over foreign investors. In particular, Ruggie suggests that where home and host states have extensive trade and investment links, home states could provide technical or financial assistance to host states on the regulation, monitoring of compliance, and enforcement of human rights standards. 84 Not only does this fail to address the imbalance of power between many home and host states, but also past practice of technical and financial support to host Third World states (whether through international financial institutions or domestic export credit or development agencies) has often focused on economic policy and regulatory reform to create an environment more conducive to foreign corporate activity. 85 For such technical assistance to work, it cannot be left to the 'goodwill' of home states. Rather, a carefully conceived obligation on the home state would need to be embedded in a BIT along with other mechanisms discussed above. 86 In any event, BITs and HGAs are only the tip of the iceberg. Reimagining these two types of agreements, although an important step forward, does not address the long history of using international law to facilitate business activity in Third World states. As the following section aims to demonstrate, the human rights governance capacity of many Third World states has been undermined by years of economic intervention by international financial institutions and is deeply embedded in the structure of the international system. The history and current iteration of this process will be examined with reference to the work of Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) scholars.
GOVERNANCE CAPACITY: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS
TWAIL scholarship considers and critiques the power relationships entrenched in the structure of international law from the perspective of Third World peoples and states. While by no means homogeneous in their critiques, TWAIL scholars (or 'TWAILers') articulate certain common concerns. 87 According to Okafor, the 'TWAIL movement within the discipline of international legal studies is best viewed as a broad dialectic (or large umbrella) of opposition to the generally unequal, unfair, and unjust character of an international legal regime that all-too often (but not always) helps subject the Third World to domination, subordination, and serious disadvantage'.
88 For Mutua, TWAIL scholarship:
is driven by three basic, interrelated and purposeful objectives. The first is to understand and deconstruct, and unpack the uses of international law as a medium for the creation and perpetuation of a racialized hierarchy of international norms and institutions that subordinate non-Europeans to Europeans. Second it seeks to construct and present an alternative normative legal edifice for international governance. Finally, TWAIL seeks through scholarship, policy, and politics to eradicate the conditions of underdevelopment in the Third World.
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In an increasingly globalised world 'national governments, even the most powerful among them, face growing difficulty in controlling the activities of business'. 90 However, it is the Third World states which face the greatest challenges in this regard. In addition, a significant proportion of corporate violations of human rights or complicity in such abuses take place within these states.
91 TWAIL scholarship therefore provides an indispensable critical lens for examining the problem of corporate human rights impunity and governance capacity.
The post-colonial era and economic governance
In his monograph, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law, Antony Anghie undertakes an historical analysis of colonialism and international law. In doing so he unpacks and demonstrates the ways in which international law has been used from colonial times to the present to subjugate and suppress the peoples of the Third World. Unsurprisingly, the economic interests of European and other Northern states (and their corporate actors) have played a central role in this history. The desire to gain control of natural resources was the driving force behind the conquest of non-European peoples and establishment of colonies.
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International legal rules were developed in relation to colonialism in order to justify and protect those interests. The underlying purpose of international law that was developed in the context of the colonial and post-colonial eras was precisely the promotion and protection of economic interests of the North. 93 Thus, as newly independent states emerged from colonial rule as sovereign entities and attempted to assert their sovereignty and establish control over their natural resources, Northern states responded using legal doctrines such as state succession, acquired rights, contracts and consent to protect the interests of their corporate nationals in these states and to resist the attempt by these new sovereign actors to establish a new international economic order which included their own sovereignty over their natural resources.
94
Anghie notes, for example, that former colonial powers sought new ways to justify the protection of concession agreements which had often been acquired through coercion or through dubious legal agreements based on the ostensible 'consent' of colonial peoples. 95 According to Anghie, this protectionism was accomplished through early arbitral decisions concerning disputes between Third World states and transnational oil and gas corporations. Anghie points to two key decisions, the Abu Dhabi arbitration 96 and the Qatar case 97 which were among those cases instrumental in developing international law with respect to state contracts. These cases, he states, explicitly demonstrate the techniques used by arbitrators to extend the protections for corporate investors and which had the effect of diminishing host state sovereignty, 98 and thereby host state governance capacity. This was accomplished in a number of ways. First, such contracts were removed from the purview of the domestic law of the host state on the basis that (in the case of Abu Dhabi) no domestic law existed or that (in the case of Qatar) such law that did exist was not sufficient for the purpose of interpreting the investment contract in question. 99 In these and subsequent cases, arbitrators drew on the doctrine of sources to apply 'general principles of law' in order to extend the laws, legal doctrines and principles of the home state (including acquired rights and unjust enrichment) to the contract. 100 Second, arbitrators began to treat these agreements as having been 'internationalised'. This conclusion, Anghie notes, was based on the asserted 'unique nature' of such agreements and on the fact that they were governed not by domestic law but by an 'international law of 92 In disputes over these contracts, international law and legal argumentation were also used to alter the relative bargaining power of the corporate actors involved by bringing them onto the same plane as the sovereign states. Accordingly, the agreements, on the one hand, were held to be 'quasi-treaties' between a sovereign state and a private actor. By contracting with a private actor, it was argued, the states in these situations elevated the corporate actors to a quasi-sovereign entity. On the other hand, such agreements were characterised as private contracts, not between a sovereign state and a private actor, but between two private parties, thus negating the sovereign status of the state and removing its bargaining power as a sovereign entity. 104 As Anghie puts it: '[w]hether a quasi-treaty between a sovereign and a quasi-sovereign entity, or a contract between two private parties, what is common to both characterizations is the real reduction of the powers of the sovereign ThirdWorld state with respect to the Western corporation'. 105 This series of developments, among others, ensured that the economies of these former colonies were kept open (by Northern states) for business as they emerged into the international community as sovereign states. This was accomplished by diminishing the sovereign powers of these states with respect to their dealings with foreign corporations, through apparently neutral rules applied by notionally independent arbitrators.
[N]ot only was the Third World attempt to reform international law [through its promotion of the New International Economic Order] largely thwarted, but it had to contend with a new set of rules, the 'international law of contracts', that sought to expand the powers of the MNCs well beyond the powers those corporations had enjoyed under the traditional law of state responsibility.
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What Anghie's research makes clear is that a diminished economic governance capacity has been a reality for Third World states since their emergence as states into the international community. Put another way, these states began their life as new subjects of international law with significantly less control over foreign investment than their Northern counterparts.
International financial institutions and human rights governance
One recurring theme that emerges in the TWAIL scholarship is how this history of Third World states and international law is replicated in the contemporary international legal system. As Okafor notes, 'despite the discontinuities that exist in the exact forms and techniques that were deployed, there is indeed a historical continuity from at least the 16th century onward in international law's tolerance of, if not active support for, the negation and/or erasure of Third World … agency'.
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For Chimni, what distinguishes more recent developments in international law from the colonial period are the means and manner through which this is accomplished. He writes:
The colonial period saw the complete and open negation of the autonomy of the colonized countries. In the era of globalization, the reality of dominance is best conceptualized as a more stealthy, complex and cumulative process. A growing assemblage of international laws, institutions and practices coalesce to erode the independence of third world countries in favour of transnational capital and powerful States. The ruling elite of the third world, on the other hand, has been unable and/or unwilling to devise, deploy, and sustain effective political and legal strategies to protect the interests of third world peoples. 108 This assemblage of international laws, institutions and practices, which has transformed the relationship between Third World states and international law, refers to, among other things, the lending practices and policies of the World Bank and the IMF as well as the growth of international trade and investment rules over the past two decades. Both of these have had significant implications with respect to Third World states' authority and ability to comply with their international human rights obligations.
It is well known that recipient states of IMF and World Bank loans were required by these institutions to implement a particular set of economic policies in order to restructure their economies and reduce government intervention. Voting structure in these institutions, as Chimni observes, has given Northern states 'a dominant voice in the decision-making process, with the result that third world countries and peoples [have been] unable to influence in any way the content of conditionalities imposed upon them'. 109 These conditionalities required, among other things, the liberalisation of domestic markets (including the lowering of tariffs, the deregulation of labour markets, privatisation, and deregulation of business activity), on the basis that such measures would stabilise their economies and enhance economic growth. In addition, the IMF and the World Bank often provided the technical support to reform legal regimes in a manner that would accomplish these objectives. '… colonialism reconstructed itself through new techniques … even while reproducing the fundamental structure of the civilizing mission. In this sense, the colonial encounter has ineluctably shaped the fundamental doctrines of international law -sources and sovereignty. Further, it has created an international law which, even when it innovates, follows the familiar pattern of the colonial encounter, the division between civilized and uncivilized, the developed and the developing, a division that international law seeks to define and maintain using extraordinarily flexible and continuously new techniques.' See also, Chimni (n 23) 72, 47 who argues that for Third World states, international law has not been 'an instrument for establishing a just world order' but rather 'the principal language in which domination is coming to be expressed in the era of globalization'. 108. Chimni tended to concentrate on improving policies and institutions in favor of investors, mainly foreign, without commensurately strengthening policies and institutions for the poor and environment and thereby creating an imbalance. For example, new contract models with fixed environmental costs locked in environmental standards for ten to twenty years.
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The study also found that the World Bank efforts to address the social and environmental impacts of reform were limited and that 'the biggest constraint to the effectiveness of these programs has been the lack of leverage with governments and/or weak capacity of governments to ensure implementation of World Bank advice'. 112 Despite the Bank's recognition of state incapacity in this area, the structural reform programmes were put forward on the assumption that increased foreign investment would stimulate wider economic growth and reduce poverty. 113 The report also concluded that 'market, policy, and institutional failures that were either left uncorrected or were created by structural adjustment and policy/institutional reforms' were responsible for negative social and environmental impacts. 114 These institutional failures included the privatisation of state hydrocarbon and mineral enterprises and assets before states had developed the capacity to regulate private sector extractive activity. 115 In Peru, for example, the increased investment in the extractive sector, which followed the reforms, was met by a significant increase in public protest over the social and environmental impacts of both mining and oil and gas extractive activity. Extractive exploration and activity moved into more ecologically sensitive areas and onto aboriginal lands. While '[t]he structural reform program supported new mining and hydrocarbon legal codes that strengthened the rights and access of investors to extractive resources … [it] did not address conflicting land classification schemes and thus mining and hydrocarbon rights overlap with protected areas and indigenous reserves'.
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The structural adjustment programmes, development policies and good governance policies were premised on addressing poverty and the needs of Third World states. TWAIL scholars, among others, have argued that the development and good governance policies allowed the World Bank to increase its intervention in these states and to give the appearance of protecting human rights while continuing the pursuit of their neoliberal policies. Thus, James Gathii observes that:
The good governance agenda recasts the neo-liberal economic policies of the World Bank in the guise of a new lingo compatible with, rather than opposed to, human rights. This conception gives preference to economic policy over human rights, unless these rights can be conceptualized within this economic logic, such as openness in international trade, finance, commerce, and reduced social spending in education and health, for example. The World Bank has, therefore, tended to support only those rights that fit within its ascendant laissez-faire commitments. Ultimately then, it is civil and political rightsthose most compatible with neo-liberal economic reform, such as private property and freedom of contract -that have received the most support in the good governance agenda.
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The measures prescribed also served the interests of foreign investors of the states that control the World Bank and the IMF. The effect of these conditionalities was to relocate the economic governance of these states to the international financial institutions, while at the same time weakening or undermining the ability of these states to undertake social reform, including measures to respect, protect and fulfil the human rights of those subject to their jurisdiction. 119 Moreover, these programmes have played a significant role in increasing poverty in these states 120 An examination of WTO law, policy, practice and its impacts is essential to understanding the current state of human rights governance incapacity, particularly in Third World States. First, the relationship between the WTO, the World Bank and the IMF is entrenched in the Marrakesh Agreement establishing the WTO. The WTO has an obligation to cooperate with the Bank, the IMF and other related agencies with the aim of 'achieving greater coherence in global economic policy-making'. 124 Secondly, these agreements have had much the same effect on governance capacity as the World Bank and IMF interventions have had. As William Tabb observes: 'the thrust of international agreements on trade and investment has been almost uniformly to extend TNC freedom to operate with fewer impediments globally. It is the freedom of sovereign states to regulate economic activity which has been restricted.' 125 Studies have shown that the liberalisation requirements imposed by the trade agreements -which WTO member states were required to adopt as a complete package 126 -can and do have an impact on the ability of states to comply with their international human rights obligations. [s]ome 70 per cent of the poor in developing countries live in rural areas and depend on agriculture for their livelihoods, either directly or indirectly. In the poorest of countries, agricultural growth is the driving force of the rural economy. Particularly, in the most foodinsecure countries, agriculture is crucial for income and employment generation.
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For Third World states -particularly those in the early stages of economic development -state intervention in the agricultural sector is critical to ensuring agricultural growth. 129 Historically, states have protected their agriculture sectors as they move from early to middle stages of economic development. 130 They have done so by using a wide range of policy mechanisms, including state trading and export monopolies; a variety of non-tariff barriers; state marketing boards to ensure price stability for both producers and consumers; subsidies for producer inputs and credit and government investment in rural infrastructure and agricultural research, 131 most of which are now prohibited under the AoA.
The AoA requires WTO members to liberalise their agricultural markets by eliminating farm subsidies (although certain minimum levels are allowed), reducing export subsidies, changing all non-tariff barriers to tariffs (a process known as 'tariffication') and reducing their tariffs on agricultural products. Many Third World states had already liberalised their agricultural markets under the structural reform programmes of the World Bank and IMF. Many of them therefore had few, if any, subsidy programmes in place, and are now prohibited from reintroducing them. 132 At the same time, the AoA rules allowed certain industrialised states to keep particular subsidy programmes intact and, through the tariffication process, to set high initial tariffs International law's invisible hand 27 on many products crucial to the economies of Third World states 'in terms of food supply, employment, economic growth and poverty reduction'. 133 The impact of the AoA rules is compounded by corporate activity in global agricultural markets. These markets are dominated by small groups of corporations which control almost every sector of the agricultural industry -from farm inputs such as seeds, pesticides and fertilisers, to exporting, shipping, processing, and food retailing. 134 There are no provisions in the AoA or in any other WTO agreement to deal with market structure and concentration of corporate power. 135 Nor does the AoA, or any other relevant WTO agreement, adequately regulate the practice of selling goods at belowproduction costs -a practice known as dumping. 136 Transnational corporate actors, mainly from industrialised states which control the markets, have been able to benefit from, among other things, protected subsidies and then from selling onto the world market at below the cost of production, with the result that many Third World states have been unable to compete globally against such commodities with their exports. Nor have these states been able to prevent cheaper subsidised goods from undercutting the price of locally produced agricultural products in domestic markets. In both cases, the livelihoods of farmers and farm labourers are placed at risk. Even if the AoA has not caused or contributed to the current market structure, the fact that it is oligopolistic and thus will affect competition means that it should be addressed within the WTO. 136. This is true despite the fact that the Peace Clause (which prevented states challenging certain AoA subsidies) expired in 2003, and that subsidies can be and are being challenged in the WTO Dispute Settlement Body. For most Third World states, the use of the DSB to challenge subsidies is not a viable means to address the inequalities of the agreement, given the complexity and cost (both financial and political) of such cases and the difficulties of enforcement. See In this way, the AoA has contributed to undermining the ability of these states to protect important economic and social rights, including, significantly, the right to food. 138 The FAO has noted that:
[o]pening national agricultural markets to international competition -especially from subsidized competitors -before basic market institutions and infrastructure are in place can undermine the agriculture sector, with long-term negative consequences for poverty and food security.
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Thus the AoA not only restricts government capacity to regulate and implement policy measures in the area of agriculture (measures with important implications for human rights), but it also facilitates corporate behaviour contributing to the erosion of human rights governance capacity. As Orford observes, such measures have further 'entrenche[d] a relationship between states and transnational corporations that privileges the property interests of those corporations over the human rights of local peoples and communities.' 140 The impact of international trade and investment law on human rights governance capacity -and therefore upon the ability of these states to comply with the obligation to protect human rights -is layered over the governance inadequacies created or exacerbated by World Bank and IMF structural reforms.
FEMINIST INSIGHTS: CORPORATE ACTORS AND THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
The preceding sections illustrate some of the ways in which international law and international financial institutions can be understood to have undermined the ability of states to regulate foreign economic activity in compliance with their human rights obligations. This section will engage in a closer study of the structure of international law and its implications for corporate human rights accountability, and will do so by drawing on feminist insights.
Many of the TWAIL critiques of the international legal system have their analogues in feminist international law scholarship. For example, feminist scholars explore how international law and legal argumentation have been used in ways that continually recreate or reinforce a patriarchal and/or a colonial international legal system. Feminist structural bias critiques, in particular, provide a useful approach to exploring the power dynamics and partiality embedded in the structure of international law.
Feminist structural bias critiques of international law 142 are premised upon the notion that international law protects male interests and that therefore its structure is biased against women. 143 In their monograph, The Boundaries of International Law, 144 Hilary Charlesworth and Christine Chinkin, show how the gendered structure of international law marginalises or excludes women:
Permeating all stages of the [examination into the layers of gender bias in international law] is a silence from and exclusion of women. This phenomenon does not emerge as a simple gap or vacuum that weakens the edifice of international law and that might be remedied by some rapid construction work. It is rather an integral part of the structure of the international legal order, a critical element of its stability. The silences of the discipline are as important as its positive rules and rhetorical structures.
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International legal discourse, they contend, is founded on dichotomies such as 'public/ private', 'international/domestic', 'action/passivity', 'binding/non-binding', 'independence/dependence'. These 'binary oppositions' are gendered in the sense that the first term represents male or objective or higher-value characteristics, while the second represents female or subjective or lower-value characteristics.
146 Examining these dichotomies is one means of exposing and exploring the silences of international law.
147 Drawing on these insights, it is suggested that this conception of the structure of international law and its silences provides a valuable analytic tool for understanding how international law and the international legal system operate to privilege and protect commercial activity.
Charlesworth and Chinkin observe that 'a variety of distinctions, ostensibly between "public" and "private", shape international law and that many of them have gendered consequences'. 148 For example, while international law 'formally removes "private" concerns from its sphere, the international legal system nevertheless strongly influences them. One form of influence is the fact that "private" issues are left to national, rather than international, regulation'. 149 Certain concerns that may have an impact on women, therefore, may be left to be dealt with by the domestic law of the state, even where this may result in, or allow for, the subjugation of women. 150 Thus, these public/private distinctions, they argue, not only 'characterise the reality of the international community … they are also connected with political choices of whether or not to intervene legally'.
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In a similar way, international law generally leaves the regulation of corporate actors (private capital) to the domestic sphere. speaks to the actions of states and does not directly address the activities of non-state actors. 153 It also imposes no clear obligations on states to regulate the extraterritorial human rights conduct of their corporate nationals. Nor does it clearly require states to deal with corporate groups in a way that protects the human rights of individuals outside the state's jurisdiction. International law itself views transnational corporate actors as disaggregated entities -each parent, subsidiary and affiliate as a separate legal entity -each subject to the laws of the state within which they are incorporated or operate, 154 even though these entities may, and often do, act as an integrated whole. This lack of direct international oversight has an important impact on how the domestic sphere deals with these actors.
Although a number of national legislatures have considered laws to regulate the extraterritorial impacts of their corporate nationals, no state has yet enacted such legislation. 155 State reticence in this regard is likely due to (or at least bolstered by) pressure from powerful domestic and international business lobby groups and arguments that such regulation would disadvantage their corporate nationals in the global marketplace. This was certainly the case in Canada with the defeat of Bill C-300 in October 2011, which, had it been enacted, would have imposed obligations on extractive companies to comply with certain human rights and environmental standards when operating in Third World states. It would also have established a system of sanctions and a complaints mechanism. The lobbying effort against the bill was led by major Canadian mining companies and mining industry associations, and it was reported that 'dozens of meetings took place' with ministers, MPs and civil servants. 156 Moreover, in domestic law, the integrated nature of the corporate group generally remains legally unrecognised, 157 a factor which has significant implications for human rights accountability. Under domestic corporate/company laws, corporate actors may legitimately use a subsidiary in order to shelter the parent company and other members of a corporate group from activities that may attract legal liability.
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Even in cases where a subsidiary is found liable for egregious human rights abuses, 'the liability will not necessarily attach to related companies and therefore it will not necessarily be the case that a successful claimant can access the assets of the corporate group … or the assets of its members and directors'.
159 Domestic courts are reticent to 'pierce the veil' of corporate groups to impose liability on parent companies for the acts of their subsidiaries. 160 This reticence becomes all the more problematic in cases where the subsidiary (which allegedly committed, or was complicit in, the impugned acts in the host state) is held by the parent corporation in the home state through a number of subsidiaries, each one incorporated in a different national jurisdiction. 161 157. It should be noted, however, that certain states have long sought to regulate these groups in areas of taxation, competition law, shareholder and consumer protection. The US, for instance, 'has developed very broad theories of the unity or integration of the enterprise, of acting as "alter ego" or whatever other phrases may have been employed to establish that the foreign parent is in fact present, resident or "found" in the United States' (FA Mann, The jurisprudence of the courts on this issue is uneven, however they will often disregard the separate legal personality in situations where the latter is 'being abused to perpetrate fraud or avoid existing legal obligations' (ibid). 161. Talisman Energy's operations in Sudan, for example, were conducted through TGNBV, which was a 25 per cent owner of the consortium, Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company (GNPOC). Talisman Energy held TGNBV through four other subsidiaries incorporated in two other of jurisdictions. TGNBV was a Dutch company, owned by Goal Olie-en-Gasexploratie BV (also a Dutch company), which in turn was owned by two UK companies Supertest and Igniteserve, both of which were owned by Talisman (UK), a subsidiary of Talisman Energy. In Presbyterian Church of Sudan v Talisman Energy, Inc. 453 F Supp. 2d 633 (SDNY 2006) , the defendant's motion to dismiss was granted and the plaintiffs' motion to amend their complaint was dismissed. The court, however, went on to analyse the amended claim stating, among other things, that the plaintiff had not demonstrated in the case of GNPOC and the various subsidiaries of Talisman Energy Ltd, that it was appropriate for the court to pierce the corporate veil to find Talisman Energy liable for the acts committed by GNPOC or the various members of the consortium, including TGNBV. Talisman had been accused of aiding and abetting the Government of Sudan to commit genocide, torture, war crimes and crimes against humanity. These acts included the creation of a cordon sanitaire around GNPOC's oilfields Feminist theoretical insight suggests that the structure of international law is such that these entities can exploit its silences, remaining on the margins and navigating between two dichotomously constructed regulatory spheres. In this way corporate entities avoid both international and domestic oversight, while at the same time gaining robust legal protections for their trade and investment activities. Karen Engle draws an interesting comparison in this regard between women and market actors. Both, she argues, inhabit the margins of international law. But unlike women who seek to be included and protected by international law, corporations and other business entities, operating from a position of power, have chosen to remain on the unregulated periphery, seeking precisely to avoid public international law's interference in their activities. 162 However, contrary to Engle's conclusion that global business actors operate solely in the private or unregulated sphere, 163 it is clear that these powerful actors are able to play on both sides of the public/private fence. Thus, the regulation of trade and investmentwhich addresses and circumscribes governmental conduct in order to facilitate and protect the activities of private capital -is deemed an appropriate matter for international law to address. 164 Unlike women, transnational corporate actors are the privileged insiders of the international legal system, playing key roles in the promotion, negotiation and drafting of these trade and investment regimes 165 and enjoying remarkable success in resisting and avoiding the 'imposition of new human rights norms on their structure and operations'. 166 The Charlesworth and Chinkin as well as Rochette 168 and others have also pointed to the gendered consequences of the distinction in international law between binding/ non-binding obligations. Matters of concern to women such as the environment and human rights, for example, are treated as 'soft' issues, that are deemed appropriately regulated by 'soft' non-binding instruments. As Charlesworth and Chinkin state:
States use 'soft' law structures for matters that are not regarded as essential to their interests ('soft' issues in international law) or where they are reluctant to incur binding obligations. Many of the issues that concern women thus suffer a double marginalization in terms of traditional international law-making: they are seen as the 'soft' issues of human rights and are developed through 'soft' modalities of law-making that allow states to appear to accept such principles while minimizing their legal commitments. 169 A consistent feature of the business and human rights debate has been the insistence by states and corporations on 'soft' or 'voluntary' forms of regulation, 170 and this approach has characterised the work of the SRSG. In the same way, therefore, the human rights of those subject to corporate abuses (or business complicity in such abuses) are doubly marginalised by being treated as a soft issue and by the regulation of extraterritorial corporate activity by 'soft' law. In the end, this soft-law approach becomes binding in its result on the victims of human rights abuses. 169. Charlesworth and Chinkin (n 141) 66. Baxi makes reference to the hard/soft dichotomy in the context of the effects of economic globalisation, which requires both hard and soft states. A soft state or 'progressive' state 'is one that is a good host state for global capital … that protects global capital against political instability and market failures …[and one] that represents accountability not so much directly to its people, but one that offers itself, as a good pupil, to the World Bank and International Monetary Fund.' Hard states 'must be market-efficient in suppressing and de-legitimizing human rights-based practices of resistance or the pursuit of alternative politics. Rule of law standards and values need to be enforced by the state on behalf, and at the behest, of formations of global economy and technology. When, to this end, it is necessary for the "host" state to unleash a reign of terror against its own people, it must be empowered, locally and globally, to do so' [emphasis in original] (Baxi (n 4), 249, 252). 170. See, for example, Joint Written Statement of the ICC and IOE (n 14) 3; Canada, Standing Committee Evidence No 32 (n 156) 10 (G Peeling) in which the president and CEO of the Mining Association of Canada testified that there already exist 'a wide range of international guidelines and standards that provide appropriate reference points for the CSR-related processes and issues'. See also Canada, 'Building the Canadian Advantage: A Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Strategy for the Canadian International Extractive Sector' (2009) <www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/ds/csr-strategy-rse-stategie. aspx> (accessed 3 September 2011), which puts forward a voluntary self-regulation scheme for Canadian companies, with no reporting requirements or sanctions. It includes a complaints mechanism. However, the mechanism allows for investigation into allegations of human rights abuses by a Canadian company only in cases where the company consents. 171. Baxi puts it another way: '[The proponents of economic globalization, have pushed for] the creation of a borderless world for global capital, even though it stands cruelly bordered for the violated victims subject to practices of the politics of cruelty, even barbaric practices of power. Myanmar is thus borderless for Unocal though not for Aung San SuuKyi and the protect ' . 174 Yet, given the role of the World Bank and IMF in undermining human rights governance capacity, Ruggie's approach to this issue appears misconceived. A significant cultural and structural transformation of these financial institutions would need to occur for these suggestions (and in particular the latter recommendation) to have any credibility. 175 For example, an ethnographic study of the World Bank's organisational culture by Galit Sarfaty 176 shows that, despite the Bank's mandate to address development and poverty reduction, there is a range of obstacles that have kept the issue of human rights marginalised within the organisation. These include the decision-making structure at, and the organisational culture of, the Bank. The Board of Executive Directors, made up of member states, acts as the policy-making organ of the Bank. Decisionmaking is generally by consensus. Where the member state governments fail to attain consensus they have to delegate authority to Bank officials. Human rights are an issue over which the Board has 'been deeply divided', and Bank officials have consequently been hesitant to propose a human rights agenda. 177 In addition, Sarfaty notes that there are perceived legal constraints in the Bank's Articles of Agreement and that efforts for reform have failed largely due to bureaucratic obstacles. 178 Consensus building has been difficult among Bank employees 'from different sectors and disciplinary backgrounds, who held divergent views on how to define human rights and interpret them with respect to the Bank's operations'. 179 Sarfaty also points to the organisational culture at the Bank, which is dominated by economists and in which the prospects for promotion are based on 'the approval of projects and the size of those projects in terms of money lent'. 180 Thus, the Bank's safeguard policies, (which address some human rights-related concerns) are perceived by many employees 'as impediments to lending because they add constraints to the tasks and thereby reduce efficiency and opportunities for promotion'.
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With respect to international economic law, Ruggie's consideration of the human rights implications of BITs and HGAs has been discussed in detail above. However, it should be noted that the work of the SRSG does not address concerns raised by the international trade regime's impact on human rights governance capacity, despite the fact that Ruggie flagged this as an issue in his 2009 Report, and stated that he was engaged in extensive consultations with experts 'on whether and how the trade 174. SRSG, 'Guiding Principles (n 19) 12. See also, SRSG, '2010 Report' (n 18) ibid. 175. Similarly, Ruggie has suggested that there should be policy alignment between a home state's export credit agency and its development agency. Thus, where an export credit agency (ECA) provides support for a particular project that has 'a large physical and social footprint' the host-state development agency could provide support to local authorities in managing the project (SRSG, 'Protect, Respect and Remedy' (n 20) [41] ). This recommendation raises serious concerns, given the history of ECA support for projects with significant negative human rights and environmental impacts, their inadequate screening methodologies and the fact that national development agencies have a history of supporting a neo-liberal or business friendly form of 'development'. See CNCA (n 172) 3-4, above. We therefore urge that the follow-on mandate assess the implementation of the Framework as a whole with reference to the proposed Guiding Principles where relevant but also to wider standards and issue recommendations accordingly. 195 The HRC did not heed this advice. In its resolution adopting the Guiding Principles, it established a Working Group to follow up on the work of the SRSG. 196 The Working Group's mandate does not include a complaints mechanism or the power to assess the implementation and efficacy of the Guiding Principles. In a strongly worded press release, Human Rights Watch stated that in endorsing the Guiding Principles and their shortcomings and by failing 'to put in place a mechanism to ensure that the basic steps to protect human rights set forth in the Guiding Principles are put into practice … the council endorsed the status quo: a world where companies are encouraged but not obliged, to respect human rights '. 197 It is important to concede that voluntary self-regulatory mechanisms and multistakeholder initiatives are, nonetheless, important tools with which to address corporate human rights impunity and that these softer norms and forms of regulations can offer flexibility that is not available in the development of binding legal obligations. For instance, as Mutua points out, the Special Representative on Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) had argued that rather than pursuing a treaty or declaration that could get mired in protracted state negotiations and preclude the possibility of using the international human rights law standards to protect IDPs in the near future, developing guiding principles on IDPs would allow him to develop a normative framework relatively quickly. 198 As noted in section 2 above, the SRSG has made similar arguments with respect to the development of binding international obligations for corporate actors. 199 The point here, however, is not to dredge up the voluntary versus mandatory debate 200 and argue for the development of international legal obligations over other non-legal means of regulation. Rather, the aim of this article is to demonstrate that binding legal obligations have an important place alongside voluntary or soft forms of regulation in any comprehensive framework to address corporate human rights impunity, and that the consideration of this important fact remains underdeveloped in Ruggie's approach.
